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The present study aims to contribute to the debate concerning the effects on economic 
performance and the structure of the labor market of regulations that combine high 
Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) with consent for the use of fixed-term 
contracts (FTC). Using a Rajan and Zingales (1998) difference-in-difference empirical 
technique in a panel of 45 countries, we explore the response of industries that differ in 
their "intrinsic need" of worker turnover when they face different levels of EPL and how 
the possibility of using FTC might change the outcome. Our approach suggests an 
original demand side explanation of the claiming of FTC.  
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The effects of Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) on employment and overall 
economic performance are still a mystery, even after decades of theoretical and empirical 
research concerning this topic. Going further from the anecdotal comparison of higher 
unemployment in continental Europe (a high EPL environment) than in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (generally speaking low EPL economies), serious studies regarding this topic 
show mixed and usually contradictory results, a fact reflected in the changing and 
contradictory policy recommendations of  International Institutions on this issue
1.  
 
  Even though the effects of EPL on the employment level are uncertain, a clear 
theoretical consequence is that labor turnover must be reduced (Bertola, 1990). 
Nevertheless, the empirical literature has not necessarily been successful in finding 
support for this prediction, such that only recent studies (Micco and Pages, 2006) that 
acknowledge sector heterogeneity have been able to provide evidence. One of the main 
explanations given for the apparent lack of negative correlation of EPL and labor 
turnover was that fixed-term contracts (FTC) could be used to avoid the effects of EPL.  
 
  In the present study we explore cross-country data to look for evidence for the 
idea that FTC can be used as a way to avoid the cost of firing insiders. Moreover, we 
recognize the heterogeneous response to EPL, differentiating industries according to their 
"intrinsic need" of worker turnover. We extend previous analyses in two ways. Firstly, 
we implement a Rajan and Zingales (1998) difference-in-difference empirical approach 
that allows us to compare a large set of developed and developing countries. Second, we 
provide a labor demand side explanation for the effects of FTC, related to the idea that 
industries where the “intrinsic labor turnover” is high will claim for the use of this type of 
contracts when the EPL are binding.  
 
                                                       
1 For a detailed survey of this topic, Freeman (2005).  
  2The rest of paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we summarize previous 
studies related to our work; in section 3 we present the empirical methodology and the 




Our study is related to the literature concerning the labor market, EPL and FTC, 
developed mainly in Europe in order to examine high unemployment rates and the labor 
market hysteresis phenomenon. The previous studies are mainly theoretical pieces or 
empirical analyses of particular country cases, focused on the use of FTC by some kind 
of “disadvantaged workforce”, such as the young, women or unskilled workers
2. 
 
Early empirical studies failed to find any negative effect of EPL on job turnover, 
as predicted in most of the theoretical models. Trying to understand the lack of evidence, 
Boeri (1999) claims that the use of FTC’s in high EPL countries creates an intermediate 
labor market status of temporary workers that increase turnover but have negative 
implications for overall employment and welfare.  This arises through the so-called 
“musical chair effect”, without permanent jobs created for ending FTC.    
  
Blanchard and Landier (2002) analyze the impact of partial reforms on labor 
markets, taking the introduction of FTC as reductions in firing costs for entry-level jobs. 
If regulations for regular jobs are kept, they argue that the main effect may be high 
turnover that could lead to higher unemployment. And even if unemployment goes down, 
they say, the quality of jobs will be worse off. They study the case of France, with high 
EPL and increasing use of FTC, focusing particularly on the consequences for young 
workers, the group they say is the most affected.  
 
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) find similar results to Blanchard and Landier 
(2002) in a framework of the simultaneous use of FTC and permanent jobs. They suggest 
that the distribution of firm ownership is likely to influence labor market regulations. If 
                                                       
2 An example of a recent study in that vein is Kahn (2007).  
  3the worker’s share of profits is small (as in continental Europe), they are going to prefer 
labor markets with combinations of FTC and firing restrictions. If the opposite exists (as 
in Anglo-Saxon countries) workers may prefer very flexible labor markets.  
 
While the previous models find steady state solutions, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) 
explore the transitional effects of the implementation of reforms imposing FTC in high 
EPL environments. The prediction is the existence of a “temporary honey moon”, with 
employment growth in the beginning since in good times the new hiring conditions are 
used, but in bad times it is not possible to fire the insiders. Slowly, the firms start 
replacing the insiders with temporary workers, and in the long run the push in 




Our empirical approach follows the kind of difference-in-differences technique first 
proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Their study aims to analyze the impact of 
financial development on growth. In order to avoid the obvious endogeneity problem of 
naïve regressions of both variables, they exploit sector heterogeneity to create 
identification, using the fact that industries with intrinsically higher external financial 
dependence will suffer the most if financial market is underdeveloped. To measure the 
sectoral external financial dependence, they take as proxy the values for a frictionless 
market, the USA in their case.   
  
  A series of studies have extended this technique to analyze a very diverse range of 
issues. Of particular relevance to our study is Micco and Pages (2006). They explore the 
effects of EPL in different economic outcomes through sectors that differ in their intrinsic 
need for labor turnover, also using the USA as the frictionless benchmark market. We 
extend the methodology of Micco and Pages (2006) to analyze effects of combinations of 
EPL and permission for the use of FTC. This approach allows us to use country and 
sector fixed effects to control for all observable and unobservable characteristics in both 
dimensions. This technique also alleviates the potential endogeneity problem that 
  4regulations present in cross-country analysis, because the use of sector level data and 
country fixed effects allow us to account for the feedback from employment outcomes to 
regulations.  
 
We exploit country-sector variation, estimating a panel in both dimensions, where 
there is no time variability since we are using one period with a quinquennial average. 
Our main empirical specification will be: 
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where Yic denotes the employment level or other economic indicator in sector i of 
country c; Di and Dc are sector and country fixed effects; EPLc measure the level of 
Employment Protection Legislation in country c; FTCc is a measure of the country-level 
consent for the use of fixed-term contracts; SUMi is the intrinsic labor turnover 
requirements of sector I; and CcIi is a vector of controls taken for the previous literature 
that interact country and sector variables. 
 
The parameters of interest in the estimation are β1, β2 and β3. We expect β1 to be 
negative indicating that, following Micco and Pages (2006), industries with larger 
flexibility requirements will have lower employment levels in countries with restrictive 
EPL. For β2, the sign is uncertain, since the presence of fixed-terms contracts has no clear 
effects on its own. In the case of the parameter associated to the triple interaction, β3, we 
anticipate a positive value, indicating that the presence FTC tends to mitigate the negative 
impact of EPL in the employment level for sectors with high flexibility requirements.   
 
 
  The data for country-sector employment and the other dependent variables are 
taken from the Industrial Statistics Yearbook produced by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO, 2006).  This database provides observations at the 
industry level for 28 manufacturing sectors, at the three-digit level of disaggregation in 
the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC-rev2).  
 
  5  The data for country-level EPL and consent
3 for the use of FTC is collected as of 
1997 and comes from Botero et al. (2004)
4. Table 1 shows this data for the countries in 
our sample. The EPL are small in China, Japan and countries with an Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, but high in continental Europe and most of the Latin-American countries. On 
the other hand, no clear cultural or regional pattern seems to explain the legislation 
regarding FTC
5. The fact that these two variables are not spatially correlated is crucial for 
the statistical identification of our study. To better illustrate that this is the case, in Table 
2 we show a matrix that shows the spatial distribution, assigning HIGH to countries over 
the median of the EPL and permission for FTC measures, and LOW for the opposite. We 
can see that all the cells in the matrix are well populated.  
 
  Following one of the main assumptions in the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
methodology, the sector specific intrinsic flexibility requirements have to be measured in 
reference to a “frictionless market”. Our baseline country is the United States, which 
according to many measures has one of the least restrictive EPL regimes in the world. In 
fact, our approach only requires the weaker assumption that the USA sector ranking is 
not affected by EPL. To show that this seems to be the case, in Figure 1 we use data from 
Micco and Pages (2004) to plot the distribution of the spearman rank correlation of job 
turnover for 10 industries in 18 countries, where a strong positive correlation can be 
observed
6.  The variable we use to measure the flexibility requirements is the sectoral job 
reallocation -the sum of job creation and job destruction- in the USA, averaged for the 
period 1973-93. The data is taken from Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and the values for 
the 28 sectors in the sample are showed in Table 3.  
                                                       
3 We use a measure of “consent” for using FTC instead of the actual use of FTC, because the latter is 
endogenous to the EPL in the country.  To facilitate the interpretation of results, the variable FTC was 
rescaled in order to allow higher values to imply more consent.  
4 Specifically, to measure EPL, we use the sum of the Cost of Firing Workers and Dismissal Procedures 
indicators. In the case of the FTC, we take a variable that is the average of a measure of maximum 
cumulative duration of FTC and a dummy that indicates if those contracts only allowed for inherently 
temporary tasks. It is important to note that the definitions of EPL and FTC are independent, since the 
criteria used for the former are just related to the permanent labor force.  
5 All different combinations of low/high FTC and EPL are observed in the countries in the sample, a 
characteristic that permits identification to study the joint effect of these policies.  
6 The countries in the data sample are: Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Finland, 
France, UK, Italy, Mexico, Norway, New Zeland, Portugal, Sweden, Uruguay, USA and Venezuela.   
The only negative correlations all correspond to Sweden.  
  6 
  In addition to our main explanatory variables, we use other country-sector 
controls taken from the existing literature.  We use four of these interactions: (i) 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), the industry external financial dependency with a 
measure of a country’s financial development (private credit over GDP). (ii) The 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) specification for sector dependency on intangible assets 
interacted with a country-level indicator of property rights taken from Heritage 
Foundation indicators. (iii) The Klapper et al. (2004) specification for sector firm entry 
rate in USA industries (constructed by Dunne et al., 1988) interacted with the World 
Bank’s Doing Business indicator of country barriers to entry. (iv) Finally, we include the 
interaction of sector flexibility requirements and the GDP per capita, in order to be sure 







For the main regression analysis the dependent variable is averaged for the period 1991-
95 and the right hand side variables are averages with one quinquennium lag, when 
possible (as in credit over GDP and GDP per capita), in order to reduce possible 
simultaneity problems.  
 
  The sample consists of 1218 observations for 45 countries, 19 industrialized and 
26 developing, as a result of eliminating from the final sample countries with 
observations for less than 20 industries and less than 3 years in the five year period
7. The 
USA is not included in the sample either, since the methodology of construction for the 
industry-level variables may imply that the presence of this country could lead to 
endogeneity problems.  
 
  7 
  The results are summarised in Table 4. In the first column, we reproduce the main 
regression of Micco and Pages (2006), exploring the effects of labor regulations on 
employment according to industry needs for flexibility. Here, the interaction of the EPL 
measure and sector level “frictionless” turnover is used as the main explanatory variable, 
and we find the negative effect of the original study. Since our goal is to study the effects 
of FTC, in the next two columns we split the sample using the permission for FTC 
indicator displayed in Table 2. Interestingly, for the group of countries with high 
permission of FTC (Column 2), there seems to be no effect of the EPL, but for the 
countries with low permission (Column 3), the negative effects of EPL on employment 
are significant. This exercise provides preliminary evidence that under the presence of 
FTC the EPL seem to have no effects on the employment level, even when sector 
heterogeneity is addressed.   
 
  In column 4 we use the whole sample to estimate the complete model of equation 
1. The double interaction of sector flexibility requirement with FTC permission dummy 
(taken value 1 if high) and the triple interaction including EPL are now added. The results 
are as expected. For the original Micco and Pages (2006) interaction, the associated 
parameter (β1) keeps the negative sign, and augments its magnitude with respect to 
column 1. In the case of the triple interaction, the estimated parameter (β3) is positive, 
significant and of similar magnitude than β1.  We take this result as evidence that in 
countries with labor legislation that combines high EPL with the use of FTC, industries 
with high flexibility requirements tend to “compensate” the adverse effects on 
employment levels. In the case of β2, the parameter estimated is statistically insignificant 
by itself, a sign that FTC only have effects when labor regulations are present. In column 
5, the dummy for EPL (1 if high) is used instead of the continuous variable, and the 
results are unchanged.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
7 We also dismiss two outliers countries, Jamaica and Nigeria, that significantly changed the results if 
included. Nevertheless, the main results hold even if these countries are included (a result available upon 
request) 
  8  It is relevant to note that in the four regressions we have analyzed, as well as in all 
the other regressions, all the controls have the expected results: (i) The Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) interaction of external financial requirements and financial development 
is positive and significative, indicating higher employment level in sectors that need 
external financing and are located in countries with credit availability. (ii) The Claessens 
and Laeven (2003) interaction have the expected sign, but no significance. Employment 
level seems to be not affected by lax property rights when industry is dependent of 
intangible assets. (iii) The interaction of firm entry rate and entry regulations is negative 
and significant, meaning less employment in sectors with high firm turnover located in 
countries with restrictive entry regulations. (iv) The interaction of flexibility requirements 
and GDP per capita is negative and significant, meaning that industrialized economies 
will use technologies less intensive in labor when intrinsic turnover is high.  
 
   In columns 6 and 7 we explore whether the effects of combining EPL and FTC 
hold for different economic outcomes. In the first we use the county-sector value added 
as the dependent variable, and the main results are very similar, which can be considered 
as an indication that what we are really capturing with the effect is the long-term sector 
size. In column 8 we test the effects on wages, and find evidence of a decrease when FTC 
are combined with EPL. This provides support to theoretical models that predict worse 
jobs when these two elements are present in the labor market. On the other hand, the sole 
effect of EPL is positive and significant, providing evidence that in countries with high 
EPL, sectors with high flexibility requirements have higher wages, a result in line with 




The remaining three columns of Table 4 are robustness checks using the specification in 
column 4 as the benchmark. One important concern for the validity of the results is 
possible multicollinearity, since the interaction terms are likely to be highly correlated. In 
fact, simple pairwise correlation between the uncentered values of the triple interaction 
and the double interactions of flexibility requirements interacted with EPL and 
  9permission FTC are positive and significant
8. Acknowledging the potential problems of 
collinearity of the interacted terms, all the regressions we have analyzed so far use mean 
centered values for the variables. When variables are centered, the simple correlations of 
the triple and double interactions are deeply reduced, going close to zero with no 
statistical significance. More importantly, a variance inflation factor (vif) analysis show 
that coefficients in regression with uncentered values for the three variables of interest 
are all around 15, while in the regression for centered values are reduced to values 
between 1 and 2. Another way to deal with multicollinearity is to create orthogonal 
values for the variables. This is what we do in column 8, where the modified Gram-
Schmidt procedure is used to orthogonalize the three main regressors. It is possible to see 
that main results remain unchanged.  
 
  In next column we address a different concern. A possible source of endogeneity 
in the model might come from the fact that sectors that face high EPL and have high 
intrinsic labor turnover dependence will lobby for the permission to use FTC, and the 
sectors with biggest employment share will be more successful in doing this.  Then the 
positive value of the triple interaction will be contaminated by simultaneity. In order to 
reduce this possibility, in column 9 we drop from the sample sectors in the highest 
quintile of the labor share of each country that also are in the highest quintile of intrinsic 
need of labor turnover
9. In column 10 we take a different approach to tackle the possible 
endogeneity issue of influential sectors inside a country. We take advantage of the 
disaggregation of the data and use country-sector fixed effects, where sector is defined at 
the two-digits level ISIC, and also the previously used sector fixed effects at three-digits 
level. This eliminates idiosyncratic effects that are common to groups of very related 
industries within a country. Our results are robust to both changes in the specification.  
 
  In order to be sure that the results do not depend exclusively on the chosen time 
period, in column 11 we perform the same regressions as in column 4 but now using as 
dependent variable the five years average employment level during the 1996-2000 
                                                       
8 With values of 0.456 and 0.846 respectively.  
9 This is also the case when all the sectors in the highest quintile of each country are dropped from the 
sample, a result not detailed in the tables available upon request.    
  10quinquennium, and for 1991-1995 for the controls (when necessary).  Using the data for 
this more recent period implies a reduction in the number of countries, now just 36, and, 
therefore, the number of observations, now 300 less than in the original regressions. 





While the foregoing empirical results support the expected signs for the relevant 
variables in equation 1, the coefficient magnitudes in the regressions cannot be given a 
direct economic interpretation. Because of the nature of the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
technique, more than between or within country or sector comparisons, the result have to 
be understood as the difference-in-difference effect at the country-sector level.  
 
  Column 4 of table 4 provides us with an adequate benchmark to quantify the 
effect. When the dummy for FTC is 0 (low permission of FTC), the heterogeneous effect 
of EPL will be given by β1 and when FTC is 1 (high permission for FTC), the effect will 
by β1 + β3.  
 
  In our sample, the 25
th percentile of EPL is the UK and the country in the 75
th 
percentile is Philippines. In terms of industry - level labor turnover requirements, the 
sector in the 25
th percentile is Beverages (ISIC 313) and the one in the 75
th percentile is 
Furniture, except metal (ISIC 332). Given β1  = -9.657, the estimated difference in 
employment level due to the effect of EPL between the Beverage and Furniture sectors 
will be 30% higher in the Philippines compared with the UK
10. How big is this effect? 
As a means of comparison, a similar calculation for the heterogeneous effect of financial 
development yields that the different in employment level will be around 21%. If instead 
of comparing 25
th to 75
th percentiles the 10
th to 90
th are taken, the difference in 
                                                       
10 EPL for UK is 0.63 and for Philippines 1.15. Labor turnover dependence is 0.166 for Beverages and 
0.219 for furniture. Then the effect is calculated as: (-9.657)*[( 1.15*0.219- 1.15*0.166)-( 0.623*0.219- 
0.623*0.166)]=-0.297   
  11employment level due to EPL will increase to 117%, compared with 103% of the 
financial development effect.  
 
  Whilst the aggregated results for the whole economy cannot be predicted 
(employment might increase in some sectors and decrease in others), the reallocation 
process between industries in countries with high EPL suggested by the evidence is 
considerable, and it is likely to affect long-term efficiency. Since the sum of β1 and β3 is 
statistically not different from zero, we might expect that this process of reallocation of 
labor from high to low intrinsic turnover sectors will not happen when EPL are combined 
with the use of FTC. Nevertheless, this not necessarily a good thing, a fact that will 





Most of the studies concerning the effects of FTC on the labor market and economic 
performance are purely theoretical or only provide empirical evidence related to specific 
country cases. Additionally, concerning the question posed in the title of this paper - 
‘Who is claiming for fixed-term contracts?’ - previous studies mainly focus on a labor 
supply explanation related to the “disadvantaged workforce” (those such as the young, 
women or unskilled workers). We extend the analysis in two ways. First, we use a 
difference-in-difference empirical technique that allows us to expand the study to a broad 
panel of developed and developing countries and control for fixed effects in country and 
industry level. Second, we show that not only some sectors in the workforce might be 
claiming for FTC, but, on the demand side, some industries will be more eager to use this 
type of contracts when facing inflexible labor markets.  
 
  Our findings suggest that the presence of EPL will mainly harm the industries 
that, due to technological factors, have higher “intrinsic labor turnover”, an intuitive 
result since those are the ones that will “use” the labor market more. However, in 
countries with employment laws that combine EPL and the use of FTC, these negative 
effects tend to be neutralized, something that we interpret as the result of the existence of 
  12an alternative mechanism that allows the affected sectors to use this type of contract to 
confront the inflexibilities.  
 
  Usually the legislation on EPL tends to change slowly in most of the countries, 
and seems to be related to persistent historical and institutional characteristics
11. But the 
regulations concerning FTC are more dynamic, with several reductions in restrictions on 
its use in the last two decades, particularly in continental European countries
12. Because 
of this, it is not possible to directly interpret our results as long run or steady state effects. 
Therefore, and considering the period covered by the sample, it is more likely that we are 
capturing some transitional effects in line with the predictions of Boeri and Garibaldi 
(2007).  
 
Even if stable over the time, the results must be treated with caution. To conclude 
that the use FTC is a good thing is not the aim of the present study. The aggregated 
welfare effects are unclear, and are very likely to be in line with the theoretical literature 
which generally predicts negative impacts. The fact that total employment levels can be 
unaffected when EPL are combined with fixed-term contracts could just be the 
consequence of a second best policy, where the quality of jobs may be worse, the time to 
find a position can be larger and/or salaries may be poorer
13. The study of this idea 
constitutes a fruitful avenue for future research.   
 
.    
                                                       
11 Botero et al. (2004) 
12 Booth et al. (2002a) 
13 Empirical evidence concerning this, using micro panels in developed countries, has been provided by 
Booth et al. (2002b) and Kahn (2007).  
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TABLE 1:  Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and 
Fixed-Term Contracts (FTC) for countries in the sample.  
 
 
COUNTRY EPL  FTC  COUNTRY  EPL  FTC 
Argentina   0.5591 1  Japan   0.0796 0.6875 
Australia   0.6738 0.0625  Kenya   0.9747 1 
Austria   0.5026 1  South Korea  0.9023 0.6875 
Bolivia   0.5207 1  Sri Lanka   1.3414 1 
Canada   0.3374 1  Mexico   1.2826 1 
Chile   1.0977 0.1875  Malaysia   0.1949 0.5625 
Colombia   0.8345 0.1875  Netherlands   1.4023 0.625 
Germany    1.0561 0.5  Norway   1.2414 1 
Denmark   0.7907 0.5  Pakistan   0.7707 0.5 
Ecuador   0.8917 1  Panama   1.4891 1 
Egypt   0.9162 1  Peru   1.462 0.6875 
Spain   1.0725 1  Philippines   1.1461 1 
Finland   1.1026 0.6875  Poland   1.0581 0.3125 
France   1.2896 0.5625  Singapore   0.6037 0.1875 
United Kingdom   0.6296 1  Sweden   1.2432 0.8125 
Greece   0.8521 0.625  Thailand   0.9177 1 
China    0.1784 1  Turkey   0.7001 1 
Indonesia   1.399 1  Tanzania   1.362 0.125 
India   1.48 0.625  Uruguay   0.2438 0.5 
Ireland   0.8314 0.25  Venezuela   0.6663 0.0625 
Israel   0.5358 0.25  South Africa   0.6537 0.6875 
Italy   0.881 0.5  Zimbabwe   0.5053 0.625 
Jordan   1.0409 0.625          
 
Note: EPL is the sum of the Cost of firing workers and Dismissal procedures indicators and FTC, 
is the average of maximum cumulative duration of FTC and a dummy that indicates if those 
contracts are only allowed for inherently temporary tasks, both as in Botero et al. (2004). The data 
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TABLE 2: The spatial distribution of EPL and FTC allowance.  
 
 
   Employment Protection Legislation 






EGY, ESP, IDN, KEN, LKA, MEX, 
NOR, PAN, PHL, SWE, THA 






































CHL, DEU, FIN, FRA, IND, JOR, KOR, 
NLD, PER, POL, TZA  
AUS, COL, DNK, GRC, IRL, ISR, ITA, 
JPN, MYS,  PAK,  SGP,  URY, VEN , 
ZAF,  ZWE 
Note: Country codes from ISO3166 
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TABLE 3: Intrinsic Flexibility Requirements (SUM) for industries in the sample.  
 
INDUSTRY SUM  INDUSTRY  SUM 
Petroleum refineries  0.081  Other chemicals  0.184 
Industrial chemicals  0.118  Transport equipment  0.185 
Paper and products  0.123  Misc. petroleum and coal products  0.187 
Tobacco  0.137  Machinery, electric  0.194 
Iron and steel  0.152  Machinery, except electrical  0.197 
Rubber products  0.153  Fabricated metal products  0.206 
Glass and products  0.153  Furniture, except metal  0.219 
Beverages  0.166  Footwear, except rubber or plastic  0.220 
Non-ferrous metals  0.168  Other non-metallic mineral products  0.223 
Printing and publishing  0.168  Plastic products  0.225 
Professional & scientific equipment  0.172  Wood products, except furniture  0.232 
Pottery, china, earthenware  0.178  Leather products  0.239 
Food products  0.179  Other manufactured products  0.240 
Textiles  0.180  Wearing apparel, except footwear  0.253 
Note: SUM is the average job reallocation (sum of job creation and job destruction) for USA during the 
















  TABLE 4:  Main Results     
              
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
   M&P  HIGH FTC LOW FTC  TRIPLE  DUMMIES VA  WAGE  ORTHOG  QQ  ISIC2  1996 
‐3.993*    ‐ 1.696 ‐ 8.684*** ‐9.657*** ‐5.609*** ‐6.245***  3.134*** ‐1.035*** ‐8.463*** ‐7.117*** ‐7.650**  Sector flexibility requirements * 
EPL  (2.103)  (2.744)  (1.982)  (2.051)  (1.973)  (2.055)  (0.625)  (0.237)  (2.269)  (1.986)  (2.887) 
       0.936      ‐ 1.398  0.473 ‐ 0.717  0.0266  0.273  0.151 ‐ 0.0229  Sector flexibility requirements * 
FTC         (1.328)  (1.438)  (1.414)  (0.437)  (0.038)  (1.246)  (1.237)  (1.434) 
       9.685*** 5.736**  6.738** ‐ 2.044*  0.133*** 8.415**  9.772*** 6.911*  Sector flexibility requirements * 
EPL * FTC         (3.448)  (2.804)  (3.267)  (1.151)  (0.048)  (3.283)  (3.544)  (3.978) 
1.274***  1.113*** 2.197*** 1.295*** 1.303*** 1.181*** ‐ 0.0543  1.295*** 1.301*** 0.833*** 1.171*** External financial dependency * 
financial development  (0.251)  (0.193)  (0.547)  (0.251)  (0.251)  (0.249)  (0.052)  (0.251)  (0.241)  (0.211)  (0.287) 
0.291  0.167  0.409  0.307  0.305  0.433  0.0115  0.307  0.278  0.221  0.542**  Dependency on intangible assets * 
property rights  (0.300)  (0.409)  (0.415)  (0.297)  (0.298)  (0.331)  (0.071)  (0.297)  (0.301)  (0.258)  (0.223) 
‐1.264**            ‐ 2.269** ‐ 0.284 ‐ 1.139** ‐ 1.147**  0.122  0.718*** ‐1.139** ‐ 0.798  0.150 ‐ 1.648*** Sector flexibility requirements 
*GDP per capita  (0.560)  (0.866)  (0.453)  (0.537)  (0.560)  (0.551)  (0.151)  (0.537)  (0.497)  (0.480)  (0.586) 
‐1.402*** ‐1.376*** ‐1.772*** ‐1.369*** ‐1.370*** ‐1.399***    ‐ 0.0413 ‐ 1.369*** ‐1.398*** ‐0.625** ‐1.667***
Firm entry * barriers to entry 
(0.215)  (0.229)  (0.516)  (0.211)  (0.212)  (0.235)  (0.122)  (0.211)  (0.202)  (0.295)  (0.211) 
Observations  1218  658  560  1218  1218  1218  1218  1218  1186  1218  929 
Countries  45  24  21  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  36 
Sample  ALL  HIGH FTC LOW FTC  ALL  ALL  ALL  ALL  ALL  SMALL   ALL  ALL 
Period  91‐95  91‐95  91‐95  91‐95  91‐95  91‐95  91‐95  91‐95  91‐96  91‐95  96‐01 
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